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preparing for the materialization of the parallel running through Boundary Marker No. 1, which the
delegates understood to be the maritime frontier, and that the delegates communicated such
understanding to their respective Governments.
165. The Governments of both Parties then confirmed this understanding. The Note of
5 August 1968 from the Secretary-General of Foreign Affairs of Peru to the chargé d’affaires of
Chile states:
“I am pleased to inform Your Honour that the Government of Peru approves in
their entirety the terms of the document signed on the Peruvian-Chilean border on
26 April 1968 by the representatives of both countries in relation to the installation of
leading marks to materialise the parallel of the maritime frontier.
As soon as Your Honour informs me that the Government of Chile is in
agreement, we will be pleased to enter into the necessary discussions in order to
determine the date on which the Joint Commission may meet in order to verify the
position of Boundary Marker No. 1 and indicate the definitive location of the towers
or leading marks . . .”
The Court notes Peru’s approval of the entirety of the document dated 26 April 1968. - 59 -
166. The Chilean response of 29 August 1968 from the Embassy of Chile to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Peru is in the following terms:
“The Embassy of Chile presents its compliments to the Honourable Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and has the honour to refer to the Meeting of the Joint
Chilean-Peruvian Commission held on 25 and 26 April 1968 in relation to the study of
the installation of the leading marks visible from the sea to materialise the parallel of
the maritime frontier originating at Boundary Marker No. 1.
On this point, the Embassy of Chile is pleased to accept on behalf of the
Government of Chile the proposals which the technical representatives of both
countries included in the Act which they signed on 28 [sic] April 1968 with a view to
taking the measures for the abovementioned signalling in order to act as a warning to
fishing vessels that normally navigate in the maritime frontier zone.
Given that the parallel which it is intended to materialise is the one which
corresponds to the geographical situation indicated by Boundary Marker No. 1 as
referred to in the Act signed in Lima on 1 August 1930, the Chilean Government
agrees that an ad hoc Joint Commission should be constituted as soon as possible for
the purpose of verifying the position of this pyramid and that, in addition, the said
Commission should determine the position of the sites where the leading marks are to
be installed.”
167. The Act of the Chile-Peru Mixed Commission in Charge of Verifying the Location of
Boundary Marker No. 1 and Signalling the Maritime Boundary of 22 August 1969 (hereinafter the
“1969 Act”), signed by the delegates of both Parties, introduces its task using the following
language:
“The undersigned Representatives of Chile and of Peru, appointed by their
respective Governments for the purposes of verifying the original geographical
position of the concrete-made Boundary Marker number one (No. 1) of the common
frontier and for determining the points of location of the Alignment Marks that both
countries have agreed to install in order to signal the maritime boundary and
physically to give effect to the parallel that passes through the aforementioned
Boundary Marker number one . . .” (Emphasis added.)
168. The 1969 Act recommends the rebuilding of the damaged Boundary Marker No. 1 on
its original location, which remained visible. The 1969 Act also includes a section entitled Joint
Report signed by the Heads of each Party’s Delegation, describing their task as follows:
“The undersigned Heads of Delegations of Chile and of Peru submit to their
respective Governments the present Report on the state of repair of the boundary
markers in the section of the Chile-Peru frontier which they have had the opportunity
to inspect on the occasion of the works which they have been instructed to conduct in
order to verify the location of Boundary Marker number one and to signal the
maritime boundary.” - 60 -
169. The Court observes that both Parties thus clearly refer to their understanding that the
task which they are jointly undertaking involves the materialization of the parallel of the existing
maritime frontier, with such parallel understood to run through Boundary Marker No. 1.
170. In order to determine the starting-point of the maritime boundary, the Court has
considered certain cartographic evidence presented by the Parties. The Court observes that Peru
presents a number of official maps of Arica, dated 1965 and 1966, and of Chile, dated 1955, 1961
and 1963, published by the Instituto Geográfico Militar de Chile, as well as an excerpt from
Chilean Nautical Chart 101 of 1989. However, these materials largely focus on the location of the
point “Concordia” on the coast and do not purport to depict any maritime boundary.
171. The Court similarly notes that a number of instances of Peruvian practice subsequent to
1968 relied upon by Chile are not relevant as they address the issue of the location of the
Peru-Chile land boundary.
172. The only Chilean map referred to by Peru which appears to depict the maritime
boundary along a parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 is an excerpt from Chilean
Nautical Chart 1111 of 1998. This map, however, confirms the agreement between the Parties of
1968-1969. The Court considers that it is unable to draw any inference from the 30-year delay in
such cartographic depiction by Chile.
173. The evidence presented in relation to fishing and other maritime practice in the region
does not contain sufficient detail to be useful in the present circumstances where the starting-points
of the maritime boundary claimed by each of the Parties are separated by a mere 8 seconds of
latitude, nor is this evidence legally significant.
174. The Court considers that the maritime boundary which the Parties intended to signal
with the lighthouse arrangements was constituted by the parallel passing through Boundary Marker
No. 1. Both Parties subsequently implemented the recommendations of the 1969 Act by building
the lighthouses as agreed, thus signalling the parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1. The
1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements therefore serve as compelling evidence that the agreed
maritime boundary follows the parallel that passes through Boundary Marker No. 1.
175. The Court is not called upon to take a position as to the location of Point Concordia,
where the land frontier between the Parties starts. It notes that it could be possible for the
aforementioned point not to coincide with the starting-point of the maritime boundary, as it was
just defined. The Court observes, however, that such a situation would be the consequence of the
agreements reached between the Parties. - 61 -
176. The Court thus concludes that the starting-point of the maritime boundary between the
Parties is the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 with
the low-water line.
VI. THE COURSE OF THE MARITIME BOUNDARY FROM POINT A
177. Having concluded that an agreed single maritime boundary exists between the Parties,
and that that boundary starts at the intersection of the parallel of latitude passing through Boundary
Marker No. 1 with the low-water line, and continues for 80 nautical miles along that parallel, the
Court will now determine the course of the maritime boundary from that point on.
178. While Chile has signed and ratified UNCLOS, Peru is not a party to this instrument.
Both Parties claim 200-nautical-mile maritime entitlements. Neither Party claims an extended
continental shelf in the area with which this case is concerned. Chile’s claim consists of a
12-nautical-mile territorial sea and an exclusive economic zone and continental shelf extending to
200 nautical miles from the coast. Peru claims a 200-nautical-mile “maritime domain”. Peru’s
Agent formally declared on behalf of his Government that “[t]he term ‘maritime domain’ used in
[Peru’s] Constitution is applied in a manner consistent with the maritime zones set out in the
1982 Convention”. The Court takes note of this declaration which expresses a formal undertaking
by Peru.
179. The Court proceeds on the basis of the provisions of Articles 74, paragraph 1, and 83,
paragraph 1, of UNCLOS which, as the Court has recognized, reflect customary international law
(Maritime Delimitation and Territorial Questions between Qatar and Bahrain (Qatar v. Bahrain),
Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 91, para. 167; Territorial and Maritime Dispute
(Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), p. 674, para. 139). The texts of these
provisions are identical, the only difference being that Article 74 refers to the exclusive economic
zone and Article 83 to the continental shelf. They read as follows:
“The delimitation of the exclusive economic zone [continental shelf] between
States with opposite or adjacent coasts shall be effected by agreement on the basis of
international law, as referred to in Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court
of Justice, in order to achieve an equitable solution.”
180. The methodology which the Court usually employs in seeking an equitable solution
involves three stages. In the first, it constructs a provisional equidistance line unless there are
compelling reasons preventing that. At the second stage, it considers whether there are relevant
circumstances which may call for an adjustment of that line to achieve an equitable result. At the
third stage, the Court conducts a disproportionality test in which it assesses whether the effect of
the line, as adjusted, is such that the Parties’ respective shares of the relevant area are markedly
disproportionate to the lengths of their relevant coasts (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea
(Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, pp. 101-103, paras. 115-122; Territorial
and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v. Colombia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (II), pp. 695-696,
paras. 190-193). - 62 -
181. In the present case, Peru proposed that the three-step approach be followed in the
delimitation of the maritime boundary between the two States. Peru makes the three following
points. First, the relevant coasts and the relevant area within which the delimitation is to be
effected are circumscribed by the coasts of each Party lying within 200 nautical miles of the
starting-point of their land boundary. The construction of a provisional equidistance line within
that area is a straightforward exercise. Secondly, there are no special circumstances calling for an
adjustment of the provisional equidistance line and it therefore represents an equitable maritime
delimitation: the resulting line effects an equal division of the Parties’ overlapping maritime
entitlements and does not result in any undue encroachment on the projections of their respective
coasts or any cut-off effect. Thirdly, the application of the element of proportionality as an ex post
facto test confirms the equitable nature of the equidistance line.
182. Chile advanced no arguments on this matter. Its position throughout the proceedings
was that the Parties had already delimited the whole maritime area in dispute, by agreement, in
1952, and that, accordingly, no maritime delimitation should be performed by the Court.
183. In the present case, the delimitation of the maritime area must begin at the endpoint of
the agreed maritime boundary which the Court has determined is 80 nautical miles long (Point A).
In practice, a number of delimitations begin not at the low-water line but at a point further seaward,
as a result of a pre-existing agreement between the parties (Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
in the Gulf of Maine Area (Canada/United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984,
pp. 332-333, para. 212; Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria
(Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002,
pp. 431-432, paras. 268-269; Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 130, para. 218). The situation the Court faces is, however,
unusual in that the starting-point for the delimitation in this case is much further from the coast:
80 nautical miles from the closest point on the Chilean coast and about 45 nautical miles from the
closest point on the Peruvian coast.
184. The usual methodology applied by the Court has the aim of achieving an equitable
solution. In terms of that methodology, the Court now proceeds to the construction of a provisional
equidistance line which starts at the endpoint of the existing maritime boundary (Point A).
185. In order to construct such a line, the Court first selects appropriate base points. In view
of the location of Point A at a distance of 80 nautical miles from the coast along the parallel, the
nearest initial base point on the Chilean coast will be situated near the starting-point of the
maritime boundary between Chile and Peru, and on the Peruvian coast at a point where the arc of a
circle with an 80-nautical-mile radius from Point A intersects with the Peruvian coast. For the
purpose of constructing a provisional equidistance line, only those points on the Peruvian coast
which are more than 80 nautical miles from Point A can be matched with points at an equivalent
distance on the Chilean coast. The arc of a circle indicated on sketch-map No. 3 is used to identify
the first Peruvian base point. Further base points for the construction of the provisional
- 63 -
equidistance line have been selected as the most seaward coastal points “situated nearest to the area
to be delimited” (Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2009, p. 101, para. 117). These base points are situated to the north-west of the initial base
point on the Peruvian coast and south of the initial base point on the Chilean coast. No points on
the Peruvian coast which lie to the south-east of that initial point on that coast can be matched with
points on the Chilean coast, as they are all situated less than 80 nautical miles from Point A (see
sketch-map No. 3: Construction of the provisional equidistance line).
186. The provisional equidistance line thus constructed runs in a general south-west
direction, almost in a straight line, reflecting the smooth character of the two coasts, until it reaches
the 200-nautical-mile limit measured from the Chilean baselines (Point B). Seaward of this point
the 200-nautical-mile projections of the Parties’ coasts no longer overlap.
187. Before continuing the application of the usual methodology, the Court recalls that, in its
second submission, Peru requested the Court to adjudge and declare that, beyond the point where
the common maritime boundary ends, Peru is entitled to exercise sovereign rights over a maritime
area lying out to a distance of 200 nautical miles from its baselines (see paragraphs 14 to
15 above). This claim is in relation to the area in a darker shade of blue in sketch-map No. 2 (see
paragraph 22 above).
188. Peru contends that, in the maritime area beyond 200 nautical miles from the Chilean
coast but within 200 nautical miles of its own coast, it has the rights which are accorded to a coastal
State by general international law and that Chile has no such rights.
Chile in response contends that the 1952 Santiago Declaration establishes a single lateral
limit for all maritime areas of its States parties whether actual or prospective, invoking the
reference in paragraph II of the Declaration to “a minimum distance of 200 nautical miles”.
189. Since the Court has already concluded that the agreed boundary line along the parallel
of latitude ends at 80 nautical miles from the coast, the foundation for the Chilean argument does
not exist. Moreover, since the Court has decided that it will proceed with the delimitation of the
overlapping maritime entitlements of the Parties by drawing an equidistance line, Peru’s second
submission has become moot and the Court need not rule on it.
190. After Point B (see paragraph 186 above), the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Parties’
maritime entitlements delimited on the basis of equidistance no longer overlap. The Court
observes that, from Point B, the 200-nautical-mile limit of Chile’s maritime entitlement runs in a
generally southward direction. The final segment of the maritime boundary therefore proceeds
from Point B to Point C, where the 200-nautical-mile limits of the Parties’ maritime entitlements
intersect. Arc of a circle with a radius of
80 nautical miles from Point A
Agreed maritime boundary
200 nautical miles
from Chile's coast
C
PACIFIC
B
from Peru's coast
OCEAN
200 nautical miles
A
BOLIVIA
CHILE
Ilo
PERU
Arica
Tacna
Construction of the
provisional equidistance line
WGS 84
This sketch-map has been prepared
Sketch-map No. 3:
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (18° 20' S)
- 64 -- 65 -
191. The Court must now determine whether there are any relevant circumstances calling for
an adjustment of the provisional equidistance line, with the purpose, it must always be recalled, of
achieving an equitable result. In this case, the equidistance line avoids any excessive amputation of
either State’s maritime projections. No relevant circumstances appear in the record before the
Court. There is accordingly no basis for adjusting the provisional equidistance line.
192. The next step is to determine whether the provisional equidistance line drawn from
Point A produces a result which is significantly disproportionate in terms of the lengths of the
relevant coasts and the division of the relevant area. The purpose is to assess the equitable nature
of the result.
193. As the Court has already noted (see paragraph 183 above), the existence of an agreed
line running for 80 nautical miles along the parallel of latitude presents it with an unusual situation.
The existence of that line would make difficult, if not impossible, the calculation of the length of
the relevant coasts and of the extent of the relevant area, were the usual mathematical calculation of
the proportions to be undertaken. The Court recalls that in some instances in the past, because of
the practical difficulties arising from the particular circumstances of the case, it has not undertaken
that calculation. Having made that point in the case concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Malta) (Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1985, p. 53, para. 74), it continued in these terms:
“if the Court turns its attention to the extent of the areas of shelf lying on each side of
the line, it is possible for it to make a broad assessment of the equitableness of the
result, without seeking to define the equities in arithmetical terms” (ibid., p. 55,
para. 75).
More recently, the Court observed that, in this final phase of the delimitation process, the
calculation does not purport to be precise and is approximate; “[t]he object of delimitation is to
achieve a delimitation that is equitable, not an equal apportionment of maritime areas” (Maritime
Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 100,
para. 111; see similarly Maritime Delimitation in the Area between Greenland and Jan Mayen
(Denmark v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1993, pp. 66-67, para. 64, and p. 68, para. 67,
referring to difficulties, as in the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Malta) case, in
defining with sufficient precision which coasts and which areas were to be treated as relevant; and
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria: Equatorial
Guinea intervening), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002, pp. 433-448, paras. 272-307, where although
the Court referred to the relevant coastlines and the relevant area, it made no precise calculation of
them). In such cases, the Court engages in a broad assessment of disproportionality.
194. Given the unusual circumstances of this case, the Court follows the same approach here
and concludes that no significant disproportion is evident, such as would call into question the
equitable nature of the provisional equidistance line.
195. The Court accordingly concludes that the maritime boundary between the two Parties
from Point A runs along the equidistance line to Point B, and then along the 200-nautical-mile limit
measured from the Chilean baselines to Point C (see sketch-map No. 4: Course of the maritime
boundary). Ilo
Sketch-map No. 4:
Course of the maritime boundary
This sketch-map has been prepared
for illustrative purposes only.
Mercator Projection (18° 20' S)
WGS 84
CHILE

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was issued five months prior to the Declaration of Santiago.
There is no need to underline the convenience of preventing the difficulties
which would arise in the absence of an express and appropriate maritime demarcation,
or as the result of some deficiency therein which could affect the amicable conduct of
relations between Chile and Peru.”
138. On 13 June 1986, in an official communiqué, the Chilean Foreign Ministry said that:
“Ambassador Bákula expressed the interest of the Peruvian Government to start
future conversations between the two countries on their points of view regarding
maritime delimitation.
The Minister of Foreign Affairs, taking into consideration the good relations
existing between both countries, took note of the above stating that studies on this
matter shall be carried out in due time.” - 52 -
139. Peru contends that the Bákula Memorandum is perfectly clear. In it Peru spelled out the
need for “the formal and definitive delimitation” of their maritime spaces, distinguishing it from
the ad hoc arrangements for specific purposes, such as the 1954 fisheries policing tolerance zone.
It called for negotiations, not “renegotiations”. And, Peru continues, Chile did not respond by
saying that there was no need for such a delimitation because there was already such a boundary in
existence. Rather “studies . . . are to be carried out”. Peru, based on the Memorandum and this
response, also contends that the practice after that date which Chile invokes cannot be significant.
140. Chile, in addition to submitting that the Bákula Memorandum called for a renegotiation
of an existing boundary, said that it did that on the (wrong) assumption that the maritime zones
newly recognized in UNCLOS called for the existing delimitation to be revisited. As well, Peru
did not renew its request to negotiate. Chile submits that the fact that Peru was seeking a
renegotiation was reflected in contemporaneous comments by the Peruvian Foreign Minister,
reported in the Chilean and Peruvian press.
*
141. The Court does not read the Bákula Memorandum as a request for a renegotiation of an
existing maritime boundary. Rather, it calls for “the formal and definitive delimitation of the
marine spaces”. While Peru does recognize the existence of the special zone, in its view that zone
did not satisfy the requirements of safety nor did it allow an appropriate administration of marine
resources; further, an extensive interpretation of the Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement
would negatively affect Peru’s legitimate interests. In the Court’s view, the terms used in that
Memorandum do acknowledge that there is a maritime boundary, without giving precise
information about its extent. The Court does not see the newspaper accounts as helpful. They do
not purport to report the speech of the Peruvian Minister in full.
142. There is force in the Chilean contention about Peru’s failure to follow up on the issues
raised in the Bákula Memorandum in a timely manner: according to the record before the Court,
Peru did not take the matter up with Chile at the diplomatic level again until 20 October 2000,
before repeating its position in a Note to the United Nations Secretary-General in January 2001 and
to Chile again in July 2004. However, the Court considers that the visit by Ambassador Bákula
and his Memorandum do reduce in a major way the significance of the practice of the Parties after
that date. The Court recalls as well that its primary concern is with the practice of an earlier time,
that of the 1950s, as indicating the extent of the maritime boundary at the time the Parties
acknowledged that it existed. - 53 -
J. Practice after 1986
143. The Court has already considered the Parties’ legislative practice from the 1950s and
1960s (see paragraphs 119 to 122 above). Chile also relies on two pieces of legislation from 1987:
a Peruvian Supreme Decree adopted on 11 June 1987 and a Chilean Supreme Decree adopted on
26 October of that year. Chile sees these instruments as evidence that, in defining the areas of
sovereign control by their navies, the Parties respected the maritime boundary.
144. The Court notes that these Decrees define the limits of the Parties’ internal maritime
districts. However, as Peru points out in respect of its own Decree, while these instruments define
the northern and southern limits of districts with some specificity (by reference to parallels of
latitude), that is not the case for those limits abutting international boundaries between Ecuador and
Peru, Peru and Chile, or Chile and Argentina. These Decrees define the internal limits of the
jurisdiction of certain domestic authorities within Chile and within Peru; they do not purport to
define the international limits of either State. In view also of the temporal considerations
mentioned above, the Court does not see these Decrees as significant.
145. Peru in addition referred the Court to a Chilean Decree of 1998 defining benthonic
areas of the Chilean coast; the northern limit ran to the south-west. But, as Chile says, the Decree
was concerned only with the harvesting of living resources on and under the sea-bed within its
“territorial seas”. The Court does not see this Decree as significant for present purposes.
146. The Court returns to evidence of enforcement measures between the Parties. The next
capture recorded in the case file after May 1986 is from 1989: the Peruvian interception and
capture of two Chilean fishing vessels within Peruvian waters, 9.5 nautical miles from land and
1.5 nautical miles north of the parallel.
147. Chile also provided information, plotted on a chart, of Peruvian vessels captured in
1984 and from 1994 in the waters which, in Chile’s view, are on its side of the maritime boundary.
The information relating to 1984 records 14 vessels but all were captured within 20 nautical miles
of the coast; in 1994 and 1995, 15, all within 40 nautical miles; and it is only starting in 1996 that
arrests frequently occurred beyond 60 nautical miles. Those incidents all occurred long after the
1950s and even after 1986. The Court notes, however, that Chile’s arrests of Peruvian vessels
south of the parallel, whether they took place within the special zone or further south, provide some
support to Chile’s position, although only to the extent that such arrests were met without protest
by Peru. This is the case even with respect to arrests taking place after 1986. - 54 -
148. Given its date, the Court does not consider as significant a sketch-map said to be part of
the Chilean Navy’s Rules of Engagement in the early 1990s and which depicts a Special Maritime
Frontier Zone stretching out to the 200-nautical-mile limit, or information provided by Chile in
respect of reports to the Peruvian authorities by foreign commercial vessels between 2005 and 2010
and to the Chilean authorities by Peruvian fishing vessels across the parallel.
K. The extent of the agreed maritime boundary: conclusion
149. The tentative conclusion that the Court reached above was that the evidence at its
disposal does not allow it to conclude that the maritime boundary, the existence of which the
Parties acknowledged at that time, extended beyond 80 nautical miles along the parallel from its
starting-point. The later practice which it has reviewed does not lead the Court to change that
position. The Court has also had regard to the consideration that the acknowledgment, without
more, in 1954 that a “maritime boundary” exists is too weak a basis for holding that it extended far
beyond the Parties’ extractive and enforcement capacity at that time.
150. Broader considerations relating to the positions of the three States parties to the
1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, particularly the two Parties in this case, in the
early 1950s demonstrates that the primary concern of the States parties regarding the more distant
waters, demonstrated in 1947, in 1952, in 1954 (in their enforcement activities at sea as well as in
their own negotiations), in 1955 and throughout the United Nations process which led to the
1958 Conventions on the Law of the Sea, was with presenting a position of solidarity, in particular,
in respect of the major third countries involved in long distance fisheries. The States parties were
concerned, as they greatly increased their fishing capacity, that the stock was not depleted by those
foreign fleets.
The seizure of the Onassis whaling fleet, undertaken by Peru in defence of the claims made
by the three signatories to the 1952 Santiago Declaration (see paragraph 75 above), was indicative
of these concerns. This action occurred 126 nautical miles off of the Peruvian coast. Prior to its
seizure, the fleet unsuccessfully sought permission from Peru that it be allowed to hunt between 15
and 100 nautical miles from the Peruvian coast.
151. The material before the Court concerning the Parties’ focus on solidarity in respect of
long distance fisheries does not provide it with precise information as to the exact extent of the
maritime boundary which existed between the Parties. This issue could be expected to have been
resolved by the Parties in the context of their tacit agreement and reflected in the treaty which
acknowledges that tacit agreement, namely the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement.
This did not happen. This left some uncertainty as to the precise length of the agreed maritime
boundary. However, based on an assessment of the entirety of the relevant evidence presented to
it, the Court concludes that the agreed maritime boundary between the Parties extended to a
distance of 80 nautical miles along the parallel from its starting-point. - 55 -
V. THE STARTING-POINT OF THE AGREED MARITIME BOUNDARY
152. Having concluded that there exists a maritime boundary between the Parties, the Court
must now identify the location of the starting-point of that boundary.
153. Both Parties agree that the land boundary between them was settled and delimited more
than 80 years ago in accordance with Article 2 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima (see paragraph 18)
which specifies that “the frontier between the territories of Chile and Peru . . . shall start from a
point on the coast to be named ‘Concordia’, ten kilometres to the north of the bridge over the river
Lluta”. Article 3 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima stipulates that the frontier is subject to demarcation by
a Mixed Commission consisting of one member appointed by each Party.
154. According to Peru, the delegates of the Parties to the Mixed Commission could not
agree on the exact location of Point Concordia. Peru recalls that this was resolved through
instructions issued by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of each State to their delegates in April 1930
(hereinafter the “Joint Instructions”), specifying to the delegates that Point Concordia was to be the
point of intersection between the Pacific Ocean and an arc with a radius of 10 km having its centre
on the bridge over the River Lluta, with the land frontier thus approaching the sea as an arc tending
southward. Peru notes that the Joint Instructions also provided that “[a] boundary marker shall be
placed at any point of the arc, as close to the sea as allows preventing it from being destroyed by
the ocean waters”.
155. Peru recalls that the Final Act of the Commission of Limits Containing the Description
of Placed Boundary Markers dated 21 July 1930 (hereinafter the “Final Act”), agreed by the
Parties, records that “[t]he demarcated boundary line starts from the Pacific Ocean at a point on the
seashore ten kilometres northwest from the first bridge over the River Lluta of the Arica-La Paz
railway” (emphasis added). Peru argues that the Final Act then indicates that the first marker along
the physical demarcation of the land boundary is Boundary Marker No. 1 (Hito No. 1), located
some distance from the low-water line so as to prevent its destruction by ocean waters at
18° 21' 03'' S, 70° 22' 56'' W. Peru thus considers that the Final Act distinguishes between a
“point” as an abstract concept representing the geographical location of the starting-point of the
land boundary (i.e., Point Concordia) and “markers” which are actual physical structures along the
land boundary. In Peru’s view, as the Final Act refers to both the point derived from Article 2 of
the 1929 Treaty of Lima and Boundary Marker No. 1, these two locations must be distinct. Thus,
relying on both the Joint Instructions and the Final Act, Peru maintains that Boundary Marker
No. 1 was not intended to mark the start of the agreed land boundary but was simply intended to
mark, in a practical way, a point on the arc constituting such boundary. Peru moreover refers to
contemporaneous sketch-maps which are said to clearly demonstrate that the land boundary does
not start at Boundary Marker No. 1. Peru further contends that the reference in the Final Act to
Boundary Marker No. 1 as being located on the “seashore” is a mere general description, with this
being consistent with the general manner in which other boundary markers are described in the
same document. Finally, Peru clarifies that the Final Act agrees to give Boundary Marker No. 9,
located near the railway line, the name of “Concordia” for symbolic reasons, an explanation with
which Chile agrees. - 56 -
156. In Chile’s view, the outcome of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and 1930 demarcation process
was that the Parties agreed that Boundary Marker No. 1 was placed on the seashore with
astronomical co-ordinates 18° 21' 03'' S, 70° 22' 56'' W and that the land boundary started from this
Marker. Chile characterizes the Joint Instructions as indicating that there would be a starting-point
on the coast of the land boundary, instructing the delegates to ensure the placement of a marker to
indicate such starting-point. Chile relies on an Act of Plenipotentiaries dated 5 August 1930 signed
by the Ambassador of Chile to Peru and the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru, claiming that it
records the “definitive location and characteristics” of each boundary marker and acknowledges
that the boundary markers, beginning in order from the Pacific Ocean, demarcate the
Peruvian-Chilean land boundary.
157. Peru considers that Chile’s claim that Boundary Marker No. 1 is the starting-point of
the land boundary faces two insurmountable problems. For Peru, the first such problem is that it
means that an area of the land boundary of approximately 200 metres in length has not been
delimited, which is not the intention of the 1929 Treaty of Lima and the Final Act. The second
problem, according to Peru, is that a maritime boundary cannot start on dry land some 200 metres
inland from the coast, referring to what it claims to be a “cardinal principle” of maritime
entitlement that the “land dominates the sea”. Alternatively, Peru notes that Chile’s interpretation
requires that the maritime boundary starts where the parallel passing through Boundary Marker
No. 1 reaches the sea, with this being inconsistent with the 1929 Treaty of Lima and the Joint
Instructions which clearly refer to the land boundary as following an arc southward from Boundary
Marker No. 1. Peru argues that, at least until the 1990s, Chile’s own cartographic and other
practice clearly acknowledges the starting-point of the land boundary as being Point Concordia, a
point recognized as distinct from Boundary Marker No. 1.
158. Chile argues that the lighthouse arrangements of 1968-1969 are also relevant in that
they involved a joint verification of the exact physical location of Boundary Marker No. 1.
According to Chile, the 1952 Santiago Declaration did not identify the parallel running through the
point where the land frontier reaches the sea. The observance and identification of such parallel by
mariners gave rise to practical difficulties between the Parties, as a result of which they agreed to
signal such parallel with two lighthouses aligned through Boundary Marker No. 1. Chile refers to a
document dated 26 April 1968, signed by both Parties, which it claims represents an agreement that
it is the parallel of the maritime frontier which would be marked by the lighthouses. Thus, Chile
claims that “[t]he 1968-1969 arrangements and the signalling process as a whole confirmed Hito
No. 1 as the reference point for the parallel of latitude constituting the maritime boundary between
the Parties”, further contending that the Parties have also used the parallel passing through this
point as the maritime boundary for the capture and prosecution of foreign vessels. Chile further
argues that there is corresponding Peruvian practice between 1982 and 2001 treating the parallel
running through Boundary Marker No. 1 as the southernmost point of Peruvian territory. - 57 -
159. Peru recalls that when it proposed to Chile, in 1968, to conclude the lighthouse
arrangements, it suggested that it could be “convenient, for both countries, to proceed to build posts
or signs of considerable dimensions and visible at a great distance, at the point at which the
common border reaches the sea, near boundary marker number one”, with Peru submitting that the
language of “near Boundary Marker No. 1” clearly indicates that this point was distinct from the
seaward terminus of the land boundary at Point Concordia. Peru then continues to explain that the
placement of the Peruvian lighthouse at Boundary Marker No. 1 was motivated by practical
purposes, arguing that as the purpose of the arrangement was to provide general orientation to
artisanal fishermen operating near the coast, not to delimit a maritime boundary, aligning the lights
along Boundary Marker No. 1 proved sufficient.
160. The Peruvian Maritime Domain Baselines Law, Law No. 28621 dated
3 November 2005, identifies the co-ordinates of Point Concordia as 18° 21' 08'' S, 70° 22' 39'' W,
as measured on the WGS 84 datum. The Law sets out 266 geographical co-ordinates used to
measure Peru’s baselines, culminating in so-called “Point 266”, which Peru claims coincides with
Point Concordia.
161. Peru contends that Chile has sought, in recent years, to unsettle what it claims to be the
Parties’ previous agreement that the starting-point of the land boundary is Point Concordia,
referring in this regard to an incident in early 2001 in which Chile is alleged to have placed a
surveillance booth between Boundary Marker No. 1 and the seashore, an action which elicited an
immediate protest from Peru, with this booth being subsequently removed. Chile claims that its
decision to remove this booth was motivated by the proposals of the armies of both Parties that no
surveillance patrols occur within 100 metres of the international land boundary, with Chile
claiming that it duly reserved its position regarding the course of the land boundary. Peru refers
also in this regard to Chilean attempts to pass internal legislation in 2006-2007 referring to the
starting-point of the land boundary as the intersection with the seashore of the parallel passing
through Boundary Marker No. 1, rather than Point Concordia. Chile considers that its failure to
pass the relevant legislation in its originally proposed form was not connected to the substance of
the aforementioned reference.
*
162. The Court notes that on 20 October 2000, Peru communicated to Chile that the Parties
disagreed concerning the status of the parallel passing through Boundary Marker No. 1 as a
maritime boundary. On 9 January 2001, Peru informed the Secretary-General of the United
Nations that it did not agree with Chile’s understanding that a parallel constituted the maritime
boundary between them at 18° 21' 00'' S. On 19 July 2004, Peru described the situation as being
one in which exchanges between the Parties had revealed “totally dissenting and opposed juridical
- 58 -
positions about the maritime delimitation which, in accordance with International Law, evidence a
juridical dispute”. In such circumstances, the Court will not consider the arguments of the Parties
concerning an incident involving a surveillance booth in 2001, the Peruvian Maritime Domain
Baselines Law dated 3 November 2005 or the Chilean legislative initiatives in 2006-2007, as such
events occurred after it had become evident that a dispute concerning this issue had arisen and thus
these actions could be perceived as motivated by the Parties’ positions in relation thereto.
163. The Court observes that a considerable number of the arguments presented by the
Parties concern an issue which is clearly not before it, namely, the location of the starting-point of
the land boundary identified as “Concordia” in Article 2 of the 1929 Treaty of Lima. The Court’s
task is to ascertain whether the Parties have agreed to any starting-point of their maritime
boundary. The jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the issue of the maritime boundary is not
contested.
164. The Court notes that during the early preparations for the lighthouse arrangements in
April 1968 (discussed at paragraph 96 above) delegates of both Parties understood that they were

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of the Court, both Parties recognized that their claim made in the 1952 Santiago Declaration did not
correspond to the international law of that time and was not enforceable against third parties, at
least not initially.
117. On the basis of the fishing activities of the Parties at that time, which were conducted
up to a distance of some 60 nautical miles from the main ports in the area, the relevant practice of
other States and the work of the International Law Commission on the Law of the Sea, the Court
considers that the evidence at its disposal does not allow it to conclude that the agreed maritime
boundary along the parallel extended beyond 80 nautical miles from its starting-point.
* - 45 -
118. In light of this tentative conclusion, the Court now considers further elements of
practice, for the most part subsequent to 1954, which may be of relevance to the issue of the extent
of the agreed maritime boundary.
C. Legislative practice
119. In examining the legislative practice, the Court first turns to the adoption by Peru in
1955 of a Supreme Resolution on the Maritime Zone of 200 Miles. Its Preamble recites the need to
specify, in cartographic and geodesic work, the manner of determining the Peruvian maritime zone
of 200 nautical miles referred to in the 1947 Decree and the 1952 Santiago Declaration. Its first
article states that the line was to be limited at sea by a line parallel to the Peruvian coast and at a
constant distance of 200 nautical miles from it. Article 2 provides:
“In accordance with clause IV [‘el inciso IV’] of the Declaration of Santiago,
the said line may not extend beyond that of the corresponding parallel at the point
where the frontier of Peru [‘la frontera del Perú’] reaches the sea.”
Peru contends that Article 1 employs an arc of circles method, as, it says, was also the case with its
1952 Petroleum Law. Chile rejects that interpretation of both instruments and submits that both
use the tracé parallèle method, supporting the use of the parallel of latitude for the maritime
boundary. Chile also places considerable weight on the reference in the Resolution to paragraph IV
of the 1952 Santiago Declaration.
120. In this regard, the Court has already concluded that paragraph IV of the 1952 Santiago
Declaration does not determine the maritime boundary separating the general maritime zones of
Peru and Chile. It need not consider that matter further in the present context. The Court does not
see the requirement in Article 1 of the 1955 Supreme Resolution that the line be “at a constant
distance of 200 nautical miles from [the coast]” and parallel to it as using the tracé parallèle
method in the sense that Chile appears to understand it. Some points on a line drawn on that basis
(using the parallel lines of latitude) would in certain areas of Peruvian coastal waters, especially
near the land boundary of the two States, be barely 100 nautical miles from the closest point on the
coast. That would not be in conformity with the plain words of the 1955 Supreme Resolution.
Hence, the Peruvian 1955 Supreme Resolution is of no assistance when it comes to determining the
extent of the maritime frontier whose existence the Parties acknowledged in 1954.
121. In respect of Chilean legislation, Peru highlights the absence of references to a lateral
maritime boundary in five Chilean texts: a 25 July 1953 Decree which defined the maritime
jurisdiction of the Directorate General of Maritime Territory and Merchant Marine; a 26 July 1954
Message from the Chilean Executive to the Congress for the Approval of the 1952 Agreements; a
23 September 1954 Supreme Decree by which Chile approved the 1952 Santiago Declaration; an
11 February 1959 Decree on Permits for Fishing by Foreign Vessels in Chilean Territorial Waters;
- 46 -
and a 4 June 1963 Decree on the Appointment of the Authority which Grants Fishing Permits to
Foreign Flag Vessels in Chilean Jurisdictional Waters. In response, Chile contends that the
1952 Santiago Declaration became part of Chilean law upon ratification and so there was no need
to reaffirm the existence of the maritime boundary in subsequent legislation.
122. The Court finds that these five Chilean instruments are of no assistance as to the extent
of the maritime frontier whose existence the Parties acknowledged in 1954, for the following
reasons. The 1953 Decree relates to the territorial sea out to 12 nautical miles. The 1954 Message
recalls the 200-nautical-mile claim made by the three States in 1952 but makes no mention of
boundaries between those States. The 1954 Supreme Decree simply reproduces the text of the
instruments adopted at the Lima Conference without commenting on their effect. The 1959 Decree
refers repeatedly to “Chilean territorial waters” without defining the limits  lateral or seaward 
of these waters. Finally, the 1963 Decree speaks of the 200-nautical-mile zone established under
the 1952 Santiago Declaration but makes no reference to a lateral boundary within that zone.
D. The 1955 Protocol of Accession
123. In 1955 the three States adopted a Protocol of Accession to the 1952 Santiago
Declaration. In that Protocol they agree “to open the accession of Latin American States to [the
1952 Santiago Declaration] with regard to its fundamental principles” contained in the paragraphs
of the Preamble. The three States then reproduce substantive paragraphs I, II, III and V, but not
paragraph IV. On the matter of boundaries they declare that
“the adhesion to the principle stating that the coastal States have the right and duty to
protect, conserve and use the resources of the sea along their coasts, shall not be
constrained by the assertion of the right of every State to determine the extension and
boundaries of its Maritime Zone. Therefore, at the moment of accession, every State
shall be able to determine the extension and form of delimitation of its respective zone
whether opposite to one part or to the entirety of its coastline, according to the peculiar
geographic conditions, the extension of each sea and the geological and biological
factors that condition the existence, conservation and development of the maritime
fauna and flora in its waters.”
The only other provision of the 1952 Santiago Declaration which was the subject of an express
exclusion from the 1955 Protocol was paragraph VI which concerns the possibility of future
agreements in application of these principles. This provision was excluded on the basis that it was
“determined by the geographic and biological similarity of the coastal maritime zones of the
signatory countries” to the Declaration. It is common ground that no State in fact ever took
advantage of the 1955 Protocol. - 47 -
124. Peru sees the affirmation of the power of an acceding State to determine the extension
and limits of its zone as confirming that the 1952 Santiago Declaration had not settled the question
of the maritime boundaries between the States parties. Chile reads the positions of the two Parties
on paragraph IV in the contrary sense: by that exclusion they indicated their understanding that
their maritime boundary was already determined.
125. Given the conclusion that the Court has already reached on paragraph IV, its exclusion
from the text of the 1955 Protocol, and the fact that no State has taken advantage of the Protocol,
the Court does not see the Protocol as having any real significance. It may however be seen as
providing some support to Peru’s position that the use of lateral maritime boundaries depended on
the particular circumstances of the States wishing to accede to the 1952 Santiago Declaration.
More significantly, the 1955 Protocol may also be seen as an attempt to reinforce solidarity for the
reasons given by Peru, Chile and Ecuador in their own national legal measures and in the
1952 Santiago Declaration, and as manifested in their other actions in 1955, in response to the
protests of maritime powers (see paragraphs 76 to 77 above).
E. Enforcement activities
126. Much of the enforcement practice relevant to the maritime boundary can be divided
between that concerning vessels of third States and that involving Peru and Chile, and by reference
to time. In respect of the second distinction the Court recalls that its primary, but not exclusive,
interest is with practice in the early 1950s when the Parties acknowledged the existence of their
maritime boundary.
127. In respect of vessels of third States, Chile draws on a 1972 report of the CPPS
Secretary-General on Infractions in the Maritime Zone between 1951 and 1971. The data, the
report says, are incomplete for the first ten years. According to the report, in the course of the
20 years it covers, Peru arrested 53 vessels, Chile five and Ecuador 122, the final figure explained
by the fact that the interest of foreign fishing fleets had focused, especially in more recent years, on
tuna, the catch of which was greater in Ecuadorean waters. All but six of the 53 vessels arrested in
Peruvian waters carried the United States flag; five (in the Onassis fleet) carried the Panamanian;
and one the Japanese. In the case of 20 of the 53 arrests, the report records or indicates the place at
which the arrests took place and all of those places are far to the north of the parallel of latitude
extending from the land boundary between Peru and Chile, and closer to the boundary between
Peru and Ecuador. For 36, the distance from the coast is indicated. They include the Onassis fleet
which on one account was arrested 126 nautical miles offshore (see paragraph 75 above). Of the
other arrests, only one (in 1965) was beyond 60 nautical miles of the coast of Peru and only two
others (in 1965 and 1968) were beyond 35 nautical miles; all three of these arrests occurred more
than 500 nautical miles to the north of that latitudinal parallel. - 48 -
128. Until the mid-1980s, all the practice involving incidents between the two Parties was
within about 60 nautical miles of the coasts and usually much closer. In 1954 and 1961, Chile
proposed that fishing vessels of the Parties be permitted to fish in certain areas of the maritime
zone of the other State, up to 50 nautical miles north/south of the parallel, but the exchanges
between the Parties do not indicate how far seaward such arrangements would have operated; in
any event Chile’s proposals were not accepted by Peru. In December 1962, Peru complained about
“the frequency with which Chilean fishing vessels have trespassed into Peruvian waters, at times
up to 300 metres from the beach”. In March 1966, the Peruvian patrol ship Diez Canseco was
reported to have intercepted two Chilean fishing vessels and fired warning shots at them, but the
entire incident took place within 2 nautical miles of the coast. Two incidents in September 1967 
the sighting by Peru of several Chilean trawlers “north of the jurisdictional boundary” and the
sighting by Chile of a Peruvian patrol boat “south of the Chile-Peru boundary parallel”  both
occurred within 10 nautical miles of Point Concordia. Following a third incident that month, Peru
complained about a Chilean fishing net found 2 nautical miles west of Point Concordia. In respect
of these incidents, the Court recalls that the zone of tolerance established under the
1954 Agreement starts at a distance of 12 nautical miles from the coast along the parallel of
latitude.
129. The practice just reviewed does not provide any basis for putting into question the
tentative conclusion that the Court expressed earlier. That conclusion was based on the fishing
activity of the Parties and contemporaneous developments in the law of the sea in the early and
mid-1950s.
F. The 1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements
130. The Court recalls its discussion of the 1968-1969 lighthouse arrangements (see
paragraphs 96 to 99 above). The record before the Court indicates that the lights would have been
visible from a maximum distance of approximately 15 nautical miles; as Chile acknowledges, the
Parties were particularly concerned with visibility within the first 12 nautical miles from the coast,
up to the point where the zone of tolerance under the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone
Agreement commenced, and where many of the incursions were reported. There are indications in
the case file that the towers had radar reflectors but there is no information at all of their effective
range or their use in practice. The Court does not see these arrangements as having any
significance for the issue of the extent of the maritime boundary.
G. Negotiations with Bolivia (1975-1976)
131. In 1975-1976, Chile entered into negotiations with Bolivia regarding a proposed
exchange of territory that would provide Bolivia with a “corridor to the sea” and an adjacent
maritime zone. The record before the Court comprises the Chilean proposal to Bolivia of
December 1975, Peru’s reply of January 1976, Chile’s record (but not Peru’s) of discussions
between the Parties in July 1976 and Peru’s counter-proposal of November 1976. Chile’s proposal
- 49 -
of December 1975 stated that the cession would include, in addition to a strip of land between
Arica and the Chile-Peru land boundary, “the maritime territory between the parallels of the
extreme points of the coast that will be ceded (territorial sea, economic zone and continental
shelf)”. This proposal was conditional, among other things, on Bolivia ceding to Chile an area of
territory as compensation. The record before the Court does not include the Bolivian-Chilean
exchanges of December 1975. As required under Article 1 of the Supplementary Protocol to the
1929 Treaty of Lima, Peru was formally consulted on these negotiations. In January 1976, Peru
acknowledged receipt of documents from Chile regarding the proposed cession. Peru’s response
was cautious, noting a number of “substantial elements” arising, including the consequences of
“the fundamental alteration of the legal status, the territorial distribution, and the socio-economic
structure of an entire region”. According to Chile’s record of discussions between the Parties, in
July 1976 Chile informed Peru that it would seek assurances from Bolivia that the latter would
comply with the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, while Peru confirmed that it had
not identified in Chile’s proposal any “major problems with respect to the sea”. On
18 November 1976, Peru made a counter-proposal to Chile which contemplated a different
territorial régime: cession by Chile to Bolivia of a sovereign corridor to the north of Arica; an area
of shared Chilean-Peruvian-Bolivian sovereignty over territory between that corridor and the sea;
and exclusive Bolivian sovereignty over the sea adjacent to the shared territory.
132. According to Chile, its negotiations with Bolivia proceeded on the explicit basis that the
existing maritime boundary, following the latitudinal parallel, would delimit the envisaged
maritime zone of Bolivia vis-à-vis Peru. Chile submits that Peru was specifically consulted on this
matter, and expressed no objection or reservation, but rather “acknowledged the existence and
course of the Chile-Peru maritime boundary” at one of the sessions between the Parties in 1976.
For its part, Peru stresses that neither its Note of January 1976 nor its alternative proposal of
November 1976 mentioned a parallel of latitude or suggested any method of maritime delimitation
for Bolivia’s prospective maritime zone. Peru further contends that Chile’s records of the
1976 discussions are unreliable and incomplete, and that its own position at the time was clearly
that the territorial divisions in the area were still to be negotiated.
133. The Court does not find these negotiations significant for the issue of the extent of the
maritime boundary between the Parties. While Chile’s proposal referred to the territorial sea,
economic zone and continental shelf, Peru did not accept this proposal. Peru’s January 1976
acknowledgment did not mention any existing maritime boundary between the Parties, while its
counter-proposal from November of that year did not indicate the extent or nature of the maritime
area proposed to be accorded to Bolivia. - 50 -
H. Positions of the Parties at the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
134. The Parties also directed the Court to certain statements made by their representatives
during the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea. First, both referred to a joint
declaration on 28 April 1982 made by Chile, Ecuador and Peru, together with Colombia, which had
joined the CPPS in 1979, wherein those States pointed out that:
“the universal recognition of the rights of sovereignty and jurisdiction of the coastal
State within the 200-mile limit provided for in the draft Convention is a fundamental
achievement of the countries members of the Permanent Commission of the South
Pacific, in accordance with its basic objectives stated in the Santiago Declaration of
1952”.
The Court notes that this statement did not mention delimitation, nor refer to any existing maritime
boundaries between those States.
135. A second matter raised by the Parties is Peru’s involvement in the negotiations relating
to maritime delimitation of States with adjacent or opposite coasts. The Peruvian position on that
matter was expressed at various points during the negotiations; on 27 August 1980, the Head of the
Peruvian Delegation stated it as follows:
“Where a specific agreement on the delimitation of the territorial sea, exclusive
economic zone and continental shelf between States with opposite or adjacent coasts
did not exist or where there were no special circumstances or historic rights
recognized by the Parties, the median line should as a general rule be used . . . since it
was the most likely method of achieving an equitable solution.”
Peru contends that its “active participation” in the negotiations on this matter illustrates that it had
yet to resolve its own delimitation issues. Given the conclusions reached above, however, the
Court need not consider that matter. The statements by Peruvian representatives at the Third
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea relate to prospective maritime boundary
agreements between States (and provisional arrangements to be made pending such agreements);
they do not shed light on the extent of the existing maritime boundary between Peru and Chile.
I. The 1986 Bákula Memorandum
136. It is convenient to consider at this point a memorandum sent by Peruvian
Ambassador Bákula to the Chilean Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 23 May 1986, following his
audience with the Chilean Foreign Minister earlier that day (“the Bákula Memorandum”). Peru
contends that in that Memorandum it “invites Chile to agree an international maritime boundary”.
Chile, to the contrary, submits that the Bákula Memorandum was an attempt to renegotiate the
existing maritime boundary. - 51 -
137. According to the Memorandum, Ambassador Bákula had handed the Chilean Minister a
personal message from his Peruvian counterpart. The strengthening of the ties of friendship
between the two countries
“must be complemented by the timely and direct solution of problems which are the
result of new circumstances, with a view to enhancing the climate of reciprocal
confidence which underlies every constructive policy.
One of the cases that merits immediate attention is the formal and definitive
delimitation of the marine spaces, which complement the geographical vicinity of Peru
and Chile and have served as scenario of a long and fruitful joint action.”
At that time, the Memorandum continued, the special zone established by the 1954 Agreement
“is not adequate to satisfy the requirements of safety nor for the better attention to the
administration of marine resources, with the aggravating circumstance that an
extensive interpretation could generate a notorious situation of inequity and risk, to the
detriment of the legitimate interests of Peru, that would come forth as seriously
damaged”.
It referred to the various zones recognized in UNCLOS and said this:
“The current ‘200-mile maritime zone’  as defined at the Meeting of the
Permanent Commission for the South Pacific in 1954  is, without doubt, a space
which is different from any of the abovementioned ones in respect of which domestic
legislation is practically non-existent as regards international delimitation. The one
exception might be, in the case of Peru, the Petroleum Law (No. 11780 of
12 March 1952), which established as an external limit for the exercise of the
competences of the State over the continental shelf ‘an imaginary line drawn seaward
at a constant distance of 200 miles’. This law is in force and it should be noted that it

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maritime zone. Chile claims that although its ratification of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier
Zone Agreement came some time after its signature, the boundary whose existence was
acknowledged and acted upon was already in place throughout the period leading to its ratification.
89. According to Peru, the aim of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement “was
narrow and specific”, establishing a “zone of tolerance” for small and ill-equipped fishing vessels.
Defining that zone by reference to a parallel of latitude was a practical approach for the crew of
such vessels. The 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement did not have a larger purpose,
such as establishing a comprehensive régime for the exploitation of fisheries or adding to the
content of the 200-nautical-mile zones or setting out their limits and borders. Peru also maintains
that “the 1954 Agreement was a practical arrangement, of a technical nature, and of limited
geographical scope, not one dealing in any sense with political matters”.
90. In the view of the Court, the operative terms and purpose of the 1954 Special Maritime
Frontier Zone Agreement are indeed narrow and specific. That is not however the matter under
consideration by the Court at this stage. Rather, its focus is on one central issue, namely, the
existence of a maritime boundary. On that issue the terms of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier
Zone Agreement, especially Article 1 read with the preambular paragraphs, are clear. They
acknowledge in a binding international agreement that a maritime boundary already exists. The
Parties did not see any difference in this context between the expression “límite marítimo” in
Article 1 and the expression “frontera marítima” in the Preamble, nor does the Court.
91. The 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement does not indicate when and by
what means that boundary was agreed upon. The Parties’ express acknowledgment of its existence
can only reflect a tacit agreement which they had reached earlier. In this connection, the Court has
- 39 -
99. The Court is of the opinion that the purpose and geographical scope of the arrangements
were limited, as indeed the Parties recognize. The Court also observes that the record of the
process leading to the arrangements and the building of the lighthouses does not refer to any
pre-existent delimitation agreement. What is important in the Court’s view, however, is that the
arrangements proceed on the basis that a maritime boundary extending along the parallel beyond
12 nautical miles already exists. Along with the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement,
the arrangements acknowledge that fact. Also, like that Agreement, they do not indicate the extent
and nature of that maritime boundary. The arrangements seek to give effect to it for a specific
purpose.
5. The nature of the agreed maritime boundary
100. As the Court has just said, it is the case that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone
Agreement refers to the existing boundary for a particular purpose; that is also true of the
1968-1969 arrangements for the lighthouses. The Court must now determine the nature of the
maritime boundary, the existence of which was acknowledged in the 1954 Agreement, that is,
whether it is a single maritime boundary applicable to the water column, the sea-bed and its
subsoil, or a boundary applicable only to the water column.
101. Chile contends that the boundary is an all-purpose one, applying to the sea-bed and
subsoil as well as to the waters above them with rights to their resources in accordance with
customary law as reflected in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
Peru submits that the line to which the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement refers is
related only to aspects of the policing of coastal fisheries and facilitating safe shipping and fishing
in near-shore areas.
102. The Court is concerned at this stage with the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone
Agreement only to the extent that it acknowledged the existence of a maritime boundary. The tacit
agreement, acknowledged in the 1954 Agreement, must be understood in the context of the
1947 Proclamations and the 1952 Santiago Declaration. These instruments expressed claims to the
sea-bed and to waters above the sea-bed and their resources. In this regard the Parties drew no
distinction, at that time or subsequently, between these spaces. The Court concludes that the
boundary is an all-purpose one.
6. The extent of the agreed maritime boundary
103. The Court now turns to consider the extent of the agreed maritime boundary. It recalls
that the purpose of the 1954 Agreement was narrow and specific (see paragraph 90 above): it
refers to the existing maritime boundary for a particular purpose, namely to establish a zone of
tolerance for fishing activity operated by small vessels. Consequently, it must be considered that
- 40 -
the maritime boundary whose existence it recognizes, along a parallel, necessarily extends at least
to the distance up to which, at the time considered, such activity took place. That activity is one
element of the Parties’ relevant practice which the Court will consider, but it is not the only
element warranting consideration. The Court will examine other relevant practice of the Parties in
the early and mid-1950s, as well as the wider context including developments in the law of the sea
at that time. It will also assess the practice of the two Parties subsequent to 1954. This analysis
could contribute to the determination of the content of the tacit agreement which the Parties
reached concerning the extent of their maritime boundary.
A. Fishing potential and activity
104. The Court will begin with the geography and biology in the area of the maritime
boundary. Peru described Ilo as its principal port along this part of the coast. It is about 120 km
north-west of the land boundary. On the Chilean side, the port city of Arica lies 15 km to the south
of the land boundary and Iquique about 200 km further south (see sketch-map No. 1: Geographical
context).
105. Peru, in submissions not challenged by Chile, emphasizes that the areas lying off the
coasts of Peru and Chile are rich in marine resources, pointing out that the area in dispute is located
in the Humboldt Current Large Maritime Ecosystem. That Current, according to Peru, supports an
abundance of marine life, with approximately 18 to 20 per cent of the world’s fish catch coming
from this ecosystem. The Peruvian representative at the 1958 United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea (paragraph 106 below) referred to the opinion of a Peruvian expert (writing
in a book published in 1947), according to which the “biological limit” of the Current was to be
found at a distance of 80 to 100 nautical miles from the shore in the summer, and 200 to
250 nautical miles in the winter.
Peru recalls that it was the “enormous whaling and fishing potential” of the areas situated off
their coasts which led the three States to proclaim 200-nautical-mile zones in 1952. Industrial
fishing is carried out nowadays at significant levels in southern areas of Peru, notably from the
ports of Ilo and Matarani: the former is “one of Peru’s main fishing ports and the most important
fishing centre in southern Peru”.
106. Chilean and Peruvian representatives emphasized the richness and value of the fish
stocks as preparations were being made for the first United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea and at that Conference itself. In 1956 the Chilean delegate in the Sixth (Legal) Committee of
the United Nations General Assembly, declaring that it was tragic to see large foreign fishing fleets
exhausting resources necessary for the livelihood of coastal populations and expressing the hope
that the rules established by the three States, including Ecuador, would be endorsed by international
law, observed that “[t]he distance of 200 miles was explained by the need to protect all the marine
flora and fauna living in the Humboldt current, as all the various species depended on one another
for their existence and have constituted a biological unit which had to be preserved”. At the
1958 Conference, the Peruvian representative (who was the Foreign Minister at the time of the
1947 Declaration), in supporting the 200-nautical-mile limit, stated that what the countries had
proclaimed was a biological limit: - 41 -
“Species such as tunny and barrilete were mostly caught 20 to 80 miles from the
coast; the same anchovetas of the coastal waters sometimes went 60 or more miles
away; and the cachalot and whales were usually to be found more than 100 miles
off.”
He then continued:
“The requests formulated by Peru met the conditions necessary for their
recognition as legally binding and applicable since first, they were the expression of
principles recognized by law; secondly, they had a scientific basis; and thirdly, they
responded to national vital necessities.”
107. Chile referred the Court to statistics produced by the Food and Agricultural
Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to demonstrate the extent of the fishery activities of
Chile and Peru in the early 1950s and later years for the purpose of showing, as Chile saw the
matter, the benefits of the 1952 Santiago Declaration to Peru. Those statistics reveal two facts
which the Court sees as helpful in identifying the maritime areas with which the Parties were
concerned in the period when they acknowledged the existence of their maritime boundary. The
first is the relatively limited fishing activity by both Chile and Peru in the early 1950s. In 1950,
Chile’s catch at about 90,000 tonnes was slightly larger than Peru’s at 74,000 tonnes. In the early
1950s, the Parties’ catches of anchovy were exceeded by the catch of other species. In 1950, for
instance, Peru’s take of anchovy was 500 tonnes, while its catch of tuna and bonito was
44,600 tonnes; Chile caught 600 tonnes of anchovy that year, and 3,300 tonnes of tuna and bonito.
Second, in the years leading up to 1954, the Parties’ respective catches in the Pacific Ocean
included large amounts of bonito/barrilete and tuna. While it is true that through the 1950s the take
of anchovy, especially by Peru, increased very rapidly, the catch of the other species continued at a
high and increasing level. In 1954 the Peruvian catch of tuna and bonito was 65,900, and of
anchovy 43,100, while Chile caught 5,200 and 1,300 tonnes of those species, respectively.
The Parties also referred to the hunting of whales by their fleets and by foreign fleets as one
of the factors leading to the adoption of the 1947 and 1952 instruments. The FAO statistics provide
some information about the extent of whale catches by the Parties; there is no indication of where
those catches occurred.
108. The above information shows that the species which were being taken in the early
1950s were generally to be found within a range of 60 nautical miles from the coast. In that
context, the Court takes note of the orientation of the coast in this region, and the location of the
most important relevant ports of the Parties at the time. Ilo, situated about 120 km north-west of
- 42 -
the seaward terminus of the land boundary, is described by Peru as “one of [its] main fishing ports
and the most important fishing centre in Southern Peru”. On the Chilean side, the port of Arica lies
just 15 km to the south of the seaward terminus of the land boundary. According to Chile, “[a]
significant proportion of the country’s small and medium-sized fishing vessels, of crucial
importance to the economy of the region, are registered at Arica”, while the next significant port is
at Iquique, 200 km further south.
The purpose of the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement was to establish a zone
of tolerance along the parallel for small fishing boats, which were not sufficiently equipped (see
paragraphs 88 to 90 and 103). Boats departing from Arica to catch the above-mentioned species, in
a west-north-west direction, in the range of 60 nautical miles from the coast, which runs essentially
from north to south at this point, would not cross the parallel beyond a point approximately
57 nautical miles from the starting-point of the maritime boundary. The orientation of the coast
turns sharply to the north-west in this region (see sketch-maps Nos. 1 and 2), such that, on the
Peruvian side, fishing boats departing seaward from Ilo, in a south-west direction, to the range of
those same species would cross the parallel of latitude at a point up to approximately 100 nautical
miles from the starting-point of the maritime boundary.
109. The Court, in assessing the extent of the lateral maritime boundary which the Parties
acknowledged existed in 1954, is aware of the importance that fishing has had for the coastal
populations of both Parties. It does not see as of great significance their knowledge of the likely or
possible extent of the resources out to 200 nautical miles nor the extent of their fishing in later
years. The catch figures indicate that the principal maritime activity in the early 1950s was fishing
undertaken by small vessels, such as those specifically mentioned in the 1954 Special Maritime
Frontier Zone Agreement and which were also to benefit from the 1968-1969 arrangements relating
to the lighthouses.
110. A central concern of the three States in the early 1950s was with long-distance foreign
fishing, which they wanted to bring to an end. That concern, and the Parties’ growing
understanding of the extent of the fish stocks in the Humboldt Current off their coasts, were major
factors in the decisions made by Chile and Peru to declare, unilaterally, their 200-nautical-mile
zones in 1947, and, with Ecuador, to adopt the 1952 Santiago Declaration and other texts in
1952 and to take the further measures in 1954 and 1955. To repeat, the emphasis in this period,
especially in respect of the more distant waters, was, as Chile asserts, on “[t]he exclusion of
unauthorized foreign fleets . . . to facilitate the development of the fishing industries of [the three
States]”.
111. The Court recalls that the all-purpose nature of the maritime boundary (see
paragraph 102 above) means that evidence concerning fisheries activity, in itself, cannot be
determinative of the extent of that boundary. Nevertheless, the fisheries activity provides some
support for the view that the Parties, at the time when they acknowledged the existence of an
agreed maritime boundary between them, were unlikely to have considered that it extended all the
way to the 200-nautical-mile limit. - 43 -
B. Contemporaneous developments in the law of the sea
112. The Court now moves from the specific, regional context to the broader context as it
existed in the 1950s, at the time of the acknowledgment by the Parties of the existence of the
maritime boundary. That context is provided by the State practice and related studies in, and
proposals coming from, the International Law Commission and reactions by States or groups of
States to those proposals concerning the establishment of maritime zones beyond the territorial sea
and the delimitation of those zones. By the 1950s that practice included several unilateral State
declarations.
113. Those declarations, all adopted between 1945 and 1956, may be divided into two
categories. The first category is limited to claims in respect of the sea-bed and its subsoil, the
continental shelf, and their resources. They include declarations made by the United States
(28 September 1945), Mexico (29 October 1945), Argentina (11 October 1946), Saudi Arabia
(28 May 1949), Philippines (18 June 1949), Pakistan (9 March 1950), Brazil (8 November 1950),
Israel (3 August 1952), Australia (11 September 1953), India (30 August 1955), Portugal
(21 March 1956) and those made in respect of several territories then under United Kingdom
authority: Jamaica (26 November 1948), Bahamas (26 November 1948), British Honduras
(9 October 1950), North Borneo (1953), British Guiana (1954), Brunei (1954) and Sarawak (1954),
as well as nine Arab States then under the protection of the United Kingdom (Abu Dhabi
(10 June 1949), Ajman (20 June 1949), Bahrain (5 June 1949), Dubai (14 June 1949), Kuwait
(12 June 1949), Qatar (8 June 1949), Ras al Khaimah (17 June 1949), Sharjah (16 June 1949), and
Umm al Qaiwain (20 June 1949)). Other declarations, the second category, also claim the waters
above the shelf or sea-bed or make claims in respect of the resources of those waters. In addition to
the three claims in issue in this case, those claims include those made by the United States of
America (28 September 1945), Panama (17 December 1946), Iceland (5 April 1948), Costa Rica
(5 November 1949), Honduras (7 March 1950), El Salvador (7 September 1950) and Nicaragua
(1 November 1950). The above-mentioned acts are reproduced in the United Nations collection,
Laws and Regulations on the High Seas, Vol. I, 1951, Part 1, Chap. 1, and Supplement, 1959,
Part 1, Chap. 1, and in the Parties’ Pleadings.
114. Some of the declarations did address the issue of establishing maritime boundaries. The
first was the continental shelf declaration of the United States, which provided that, whenever the
continental shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared with an adjacent State, the
boundary shall be determined by the United States and the State concerned in accordance with
equitable principles. Those of Mexico and Costa Rica (like that of Chile, see paragraph 37 above)
stated that the particular declaration each had made did not mean that that Government sought to
disregard the lawful rights of other States, based on reciprocity. The wording in the Argentinean
decree accorded conditional recognition to the right of each nation to the same entitlements as it
claimed. Proclamations made by the Arab States then under United Kingdom protection all
provided in similar terms that their exclusive jurisdiction and control of the sea-bed and subsoil
extended to boundaries to be determined more precisely, as occasion arises, on equitable or, in one
case, just principles, after consultation with the neighbouring States. - 44 -
115. Those declarations were part of the background against which the International Law
Commission worked in preparing its 1956 draft articles for the United Nations Conference on the
Law of the Sea, held in 1958. On the basis, among other things, of the material summarized above,
the report of a committee of experts, and comments by a significant range of States, the
Commission proposed that, in the absence of an agreement or special circumstances, an
equidistance line be used for delimitation of both the territorial sea and the continental shelf. The
Commission in particular rejected, in the absence of an agreement, as a basis for the line the
geographical parallel passing through the point at which the land frontier meets the coast. Chile
and Ecuador in their observations submitted to the Commission contended that the rights of the
coastal State over its continental shelf went beyond just “control” and “jurisdiction”; Chile, in
addition, called for “sovereignty” over both the continental shelf and superjacent waters. However,
neither State made any comment on the matter of delimitation. Peru made no comment of any
kind. This further supports the view that the chief concern of the three States in this period was
defending their 200-nautical-mile claims as against third States. The Commission’s proposals were
adopted by the 1958 Conference and incorporated, with drafting amendments, in the Convention on
the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone (Art. 12) and the Convention on the Continental Shelf
(Art. 6). The territorial sea was not seen by the International Law Commission, and would not
have been seen at that time by most nations, as extending beyond 6 nautical miles and the
continental shelf line was for the sea-bed and subsoil, extending to a 200-metre depth or beyond to
the limit of exploitability, and not for the resources of the water above the shelf.
116. The Court observes that, during the period under consideration, the proposal in respect
of the rights of a State over its waters which came nearest to general international acceptance was
for a 6-nautical-mile territorial sea with a further fishing zone of 6 nautical miles and some
reservation of established fishing rights. As the Court has noted previously, in this period the
concept of an exclusive economic zone of 200 nautical miles was “still some long years away”
(Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 87, para. 70), while its general acceptance in practice and in the 1982 United Nations Convention
on the Law of the Sea was about 30 years into the future. In answering a question from a Member

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The Court notes that this original Chilean proposal appears intended to effect a general delimitation
of the maritime zones along lateral lines. However, this proposal was not adopted.
68. Further, the Minutes of the 1952 Conference indicate that the delegate for Ecuador:
“observed that it would be advisable to provide more clarity to article 3 [which
became paragraph IV of the final text of the 1952 Santiago Declaration], in order to
avoid any error in the interpretation of the interference zone in the case of islands, and
suggested that the declaration be drafted on the basis that the boundary line of the
jurisdictional zone of each country be the respective parallel from the point at which
the frontier of the countries touches or reaches the sea”.
According to the Minutes, this proposition met with the agreement of all of the delegates. - 30 -
Ecuador’s intervention, with which the Parties agreed, is limited in its concern to
clarification “in the case of islands”. Thus the Court is of the view that it can be understood as
saying no more than that which is already stated in the final text of paragraph IV. The Court
considers from the foregoing that the travaux préparatoires confirm its conclusion that the
1952 Santiago Declaration did not effect a general maritime delimitation.
69. Nevertheless, various factors mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, such as the original
Chilean proposal and the use of the parallel as the limit of the maritime zone of an island of one
State party located less than 200 nautical miles from the general maritime zone of another State
party, suggest that there might have been some sort of shared understanding among the States
parties of a more general nature concerning their maritime boundaries. The Court will return to
this matter later.
70. The Court has concluded, contrary to Chile’s submissions, that Chile and Peru did not,
by adopting the 1952 Santiago Declaration, agree to the establishment of a lateral maritime
boundary between them along the line of latitude running into the Pacific Ocean from the seaward
terminus of their land boundary. However, in support of its claim that that line constitutes the
maritime boundary, Chile also invokes agreements and arrangements which it signed later with
Ecuador and Peru, and with Peru alone.
3. The various 1954 Agreements
71. Among the agreements adopted in 1954, Chile emphasizes, in particular, the
Complementary Convention to the 1952 Santiago Declaration and the Special Maritime Frontier
Zone Agreement. It puts the meetings that led to those agreements and the agreements themselves
in the context of the challenges which six maritime powers had made to the 1952 Santiago
Declaration in the period running from August to late October 1954 and of the planned whale
hunting by a fleet operating under the Panamanian flag.
72. The meeting of the CPPS, preparatory to the Inter-State conference of December 1954,
was held between 4 and 8 October 1954. The provisional agenda items correspond to five of the
six agreements which were drafted and adopted at the December Inter-State Conference: the
Complementary Convention to the 1952 Santiago Declaration, the Convention on the System of
Sanctions, the Agreement on the Annual Meeting of the CPPS, the Convention on Supervision and
Control, and the Convention on the Granting of Permits for the Exploitation of the Resources of the
South Pacific.
73. The 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement also resulted from the meetings
that took place in 1954. In addition to considering the matters listed on the provisional agenda
described above, the October 1954 meeting of the CPPS also considered a proposal by the
Delegations of Ecuador and Peru to establish a “neutral zone . . . on either side of the parallel which
passes through the point of the coast that signals the boundary between the two countries”. The
Permanent Commission approved the proposal unanimously “and, consequently, entrusted its
- 31 -
Secretariat-General to transmit this recommendation to the signatory countries so that they put into
practice this norm of tolerance on fishing activities”. As a consequence, at the inaugural session of
“The Second Conference on the Exploitation and Conservation of the Marine Resources of the
South Pacific”, the proposed Agreement appeared in the agenda as the last of the six Agreements to
be considered and signed in December 1954. The draft text relating to the proposal to establish a
“neutral zone” along the parallel was then amended in certain respects. The term “neutral zone”
was replaced with the term “special maritime frontier zone” and the reference to “the parallel
which passes through the point of the coast that signals the boundary between the two countries”
was replaced with “the parallel which constitutes the maritime boundary between the two
countries”. This is the language that appears in the first paragraph of the final text of the
1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, which was adopted along with the other five
agreements referred to in the preceding paragraph. All of the agreements included a standard
clause, added late in the drafting process without any explanation recorded in the Minutes.
According to this clause, the provisions contained in the agreements were “deemed to be an
integral and supplementary part” of the resolutions and agreements adopted in 1952 and were “not
in any way to abrogate” them. Of these six Agreements only the 1954 Complementary Convention
and the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement were given any real attention by the
Parties in the course of these proceedings, except for brief references by Chile to the Supervision
and Control Convention (see paragraph 78 below). The Court notes that the 1954 Special Maritime
Frontier Zone Agreement is still in force.
A. The Complementary Convention to the 1952 Santiago Declaration
74. According to Chile, “the main instrument” prepared at the 1954 Inter-State Conference
was the Complementary Convention, “[t]he primary purpose [of which] was to reassert the claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction that had been made two years earlier in Santiago and to defend jointly
the claim against protests by third States”. It quotes its Foreign Minister speaking at the inaugural
session of the 1954 CPPS Meeting:
“The right to proclaim our sovereignty over the sea zone that extends to two
hundred miles from the coast is thus undeniable and inalienable. We gather now to
reaffirm our decision to defend, whatever the cost, this sovereignty and to exercise it
in accordance with the high national interests of the signatory countries to the
Declaration.
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
We strongly believe that, little by little, the legal statement that has been
formulated by our countries into the 1952 Agreement [the Santiago Declaration] will
find its place in International Law until it is accepted by all Governments that wish to
preserve, for mankind, resources that today are ruthlessly destroyed by the unregulated
exercise of exploitative activities that pursue diminished individual interests and not
collective needs.”
75. Peru similarly contends that the purpose of the 1954 Complementary Convention was to
reinforce regional solidarity in the face of opposition from third States to the 200-nautical-mile
claim. It observes that in 1954, as in 1952, the primary focus of the three States was on
- 32 -
maintaining a united front towards third States, “rather than upon the development of an internal
legal régime defining their rights inter se”. It also contends that the 1954 instruments were adopted
in the context of regional solidarity vis-à-vis third States and that they were essentially an integral
part of the agreements and resolutions adopted in 1952. The Inter-State Conference was in fact
held less than a month after the Peruvian Navy, with the co-operation of its air force, had seized
vessels of the Onassis whaling fleet, under the Panamanian flag, more than 100 nautical miles off
shore (for extracts from the Peruvian Judgment imposing fines see American Journal of
International Law, 1955, Vol. 49, p. 575). Peru notes that when it rejected a United Kingdom
protest against the seizure of the Onassis vessels, the Chilean Foreign Minister sent a
congratulatory message to his Peruvian counterpart  according to Peru this was “an indication of
the regional solidarity which the zone embodied”. In its Reply, Peru recalls Chile’s
characterization in its Counter-Memorial of the 1954 Complementary Convention as “the main
instrument” prepared at the 1954 Inter-State Conference.
76. The Parties also refer to the agreed responses which they made, after careful preparation
in the first part of 1955, to the protests made by maritime powers against the 1952 Santiago
Declaration. Those responses were made in accordance with the spirit of the Complementary
Convention even though Chile was not then or later a party to it. Similar co-ordinated action was
taken in May 1955 in response to related proposals made by the United States of America.
*
77. The Court observes that it is common ground that the proposed Complementary
Convention was the main instrument addressed by Chile, Ecuador and Peru as they prepared for the
CPPS meeting and the Inter-State Conference in Lima in the final months of 1954. Given the
challenges being made by several States to the 1952 Santiago Declaration, the primary purpose of
that Convention was to assert, particularly against the major maritime powers, their claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction made jointly in 1952. It was also designed to help prepare their
common defence of the claim against the protests by those States, which was the subject-matter of
the second agenda item of the 1954 Inter-State Conference. It does not follow, however, that the
“primary purpose” was the sole purpose or even less that the primary purpose determined the sole
outcome of the 1954 meetings and the Inter-State Conference.
B. The Agreement relating to Measures of Supervision and Control of the Maritime Zones of
the Signatory Countries
78. Chile seeks support from another of the 1954 Agreements, the Agreement relating to
Measures of Supervision and Control of the Maritime Zones of the Signatory Countries. It quotes
the first and second articles: - 33 -
“First
It shall be the function of each signatory country to supervise and control the
exploitation of the resources in its Maritime Zone by the use of such organs and means
as it considers necessary.
Second
The supervision and control referred to in article one shall be exercised by each
country exclusively in the waters of its jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added by Chile.)
Chile contends that the second article proceeds on the basis that each State’s maritime zone had
been delimited. Peru made no reference to the substance of this Agreement. Chile also referred in
this context to the 1955 Agreement for the Regulation of Permits for Exploitation of the Resources
of the South Pacific (see paragraph 21 above) and to its 1959 Decree providing for that regulation.
79. The Court considers that at this early stage there were at least in practice distinct
maritime zones in which each of the three States might, in terms of the 1952 Santiago Declaration,
take action as indeed was exemplified by the action taken by Peru against the Onassis whaling fleet
shortly before the Lima Conference; other instances of enforcement by the two Parties are
discussed later. However the Agreements on Supervision and Control and on the Regulation of
Permits give no indication about the location or nature of boundaries of the zones. On the matter of
boundaries, the Court now turns to the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement.
C. The Agreement relating to a Special Maritime Frontier Zone
80. The Preamble to the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement reads as follows:
“Experience has shown that innocent and inadvertent violations of the maritime
frontier [‘la frontera marítima’] between adjacent States occur frequently because
small vessels manned by crews with insufficient knowledge of navigation or not
equipped with the necessary instruments have difficulty in determining accurately
their position on the high seas;
The application of penalties in such cases always produces ill-feeling in the
fishermen and friction between the countries concerned, which may affect adversely
the spirit of co-operation and unity which should at all times prevail among the
countries signatories to the instruments signed at Santiago; and
It is desirable to avoid the occurrence of such unintentional infringements, the
consequences of which affect principally the fishermen.” - 34 -
81. The substantive provisions of the Agreement read as follows:
“1. A special zone is hereby established, at a distance of [‘a partir de’]
12 nautical miles from the coast, extending to a breadth of 10 nautical miles on either
side of the parallel which constitutes the maritime boundary [‘el límite marítimo’]
between the two countries.
2. The accidental presence in the said zone of a vessel of either of the adjacent
countries, which is a vessel of the nature described in the paragraph beginning with
the words ‘Experience has shown’ in the preamble hereto, shall not be considered to
be a violation of the waters of the maritime zone, though this provision shall not be
construed as recognizing any right to engage, with deliberate intent, in hunting or
fishing in the said special zone.
3. Fishing or hunting within the zone of 12 nautical miles from the coast shall
be reserved exclusively to the nationals of each country.”
Article 4 is the standard provision, included in all six of the 1954 Agreements, deeming it to be “an
integral and supplementary part” of the 1952 instruments which it was not in any way to abrogate
(see paragraph 73 above).
82. According to Chile, the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement was “the most
relevant instrument adopted at the December 1954 Conference”. Its “basic predicate” was that the
three States “already had lateral boundaries, or ‘frontiers’, in place between them”. Chile
continues, citing the Judgment in the case concerning Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya/Chad), that in the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement “the existence of a
determined frontier was accepted and acted upon” (I.C.J. Reports 1994, p. 35, para. 66). It points
out that Article 1 uses the present tense, referring to a maritime boundary already in existence, and
the first recital indicates that it was violations of that existing boundary that prompted the
Agreement.
83. Peru contends (1) that the Agreement was applicable only to Peru’s northern maritime
border, that is, with Ecuador, and not also to the southern one, with Chile; (2) that Chile’s delay in
ratifying (in 1967) and registering (in 2004) the Agreement shows that it did not regard it as of
major importance such as establishing a maritime boundary; and (3) that the Agreement had a very
special and temporary purpose and that the Parties were claiming a limited functional jurisdiction.
Peru in its written pleadings, in support of its contention that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier
Zone Agreement applied only to its boundary with Ecuador and not to that with Chile, said that the
“rather opaque formula”  the reference to the parallel in Article 1, introduced on the proposal of
Ecuador  referred to only one parallel between two countries; it seems clear, Peru says, that the
focus was on the waters between Peru and Ecuador. - 35 -
84. With regard to Peru’s first argument, Chile in reply points out that the 1954 Special
Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement has three States parties and that the ordinary meaning of “the
two countries” in Article 1 is a reference to the States on either side of their shared maritime
boundary. Chile notes that there is no qualification of the “maritime frontier” (in the Preamble),
nor is there any suggestion that the term “adjacent States” refers only to Ecuador and Peru. Chile
also points out that in 1962 Peru complained to Chile about “the frequency with which Chilean
fishing vessels have trespassed into Peruvian waters”, stating that “the Government of Peru, taking
strongly into account the sense and provisions of ‘the Agreement’” wished that the Government of
Chile take certain steps particularly through the competent authorities at the port of Arica. As
Chile noted, Peru did not at that stage make any reference to the argument that the 1954 Special
Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement applied only to its northern maritime boundary.
85. In the view of the Court, there is nothing at all in the terms of the 1954 Special Maritime
Frontier Zone Agreement which would limit it only to the Ecuador-Peru maritime boundary.
Moreover Peru did not in practice accord it that limited meaning which would preclude its
application to Peru’s southern maritime boundary with Chile. The Court further notes that the
1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement was negotiated and signed by the representatives
of all three States, both in the Commission and at the Inter-State Conference. All three States then
proceeded to ratify it. They included it among the twelve treaties which they jointly submitted to
the United Nations Secretariat for registration in 1973 (see paragraph 21 above).
*
86. With regard to Peru’s second argument, Chile responds by pointing out that delay in
ratification is common and contends that of itself the delay in ratification has no consequence for
the legal effect of a treaty once it has entered into force. Further, it submits that the fact that
registration of an Agreement is delayed is of no relevance.
87. The Court is of the view that Chile’s delay in ratifying the 1954 Special Maritime
Frontier Zone Agreement and submitting it for registration does not support Peru’s argument that
Chile considered that the Agreement lacked major importance. In any event, this delay has no
bearing on the scope and effect of the Agreement. Once ratified by Chile the Agreement became
binding on it. In terms of the argument about Chile’s delay in submitting the Agreement for
registration, the Court recalls that, in 1973, all three States signatory to the 1952 and 1954 treaties,
including the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone Agreement, simultaneously submitted all of
them for registration (see paragraphs 20 to 21 above).
88. With regard to Peru’s third argument that the 1954 Special Maritime Frontier Zone
Agreement had a special and temporary purpose and that the Parties were claiming a limited
functional jurisdiction, Chile’s central contention is that the “basic predicate” of the Agreement
- 36 -
was that the three States “already had lateral boundaries, or ‘frontiers’, in place between them” (see
paragraph 82 above). The reference in the title of the Agreement to a Special Maritime Frontier
Zone and in the recitals to violations of the maritime frontier between adjacent States demonstrates,
Chile contends, that a maritime frontier or boundary already existed when the three States
concluded the Agreement in December 1954. The granting to small vessels of the benefit of a zone
of tolerance was, in terms of the Preamble, intended to avoid “friction between the countries
concerned, which may affect adversely the spirit of co-operation and unity which should at all
times prevail among the countries signatories to the instruments signed at Santiago”. According to
Chile, this was an inter-State problem and “not a problem relating to itinerant fishermen”. The
States wished to eliminate obstacles to their complete co-operation in defence of their maritime
claims. Chile emphasizes that Article 1, the primary substantive provision, is in the present tense:
the ten-nautical-mile zones are being created to the north and south of a maritime boundary which
already exists. Article 2, it says, also supports its position. The “accidental presence” in that zone
of the vessels referred to in the Agreement is not considered a “violation” of the adjacent State’s